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NOTES
Ginzburg et. al. -An Attack on
Freedom of Expression
O N MARCH 21, 1966, the United States Supreme Court struck a
forceful blow at the dissemination of purportedly obscene ma-
terial. In Ginzburg v. United States' and Mishkin v. New York,2
it upheld criminal convictions for the purveyance of "obscene" ma-
terials, emphasizing a new element. Intrinsically non-obscene ma-
terial may now become suppressible depending on the method and
manner employed in advertising it.' In A Book Named "John
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts,4 al-
though it reversed the non-criminal finding of obscenity, the Court
emphasized the same new element, thus nullifying the import of its
reversal.
These decisions were received with surprise by many attorneys
and laymen inasmuch as none of the Supreme Court's prior decisions
concerning obscenity portended such an outcome. Prior decisions,
perhaps most notably jacobellis v. Ohio,5 indicated the extreme con-
fusion of the Court in this area and the division in views among the
nine Justices. But Roth v. United States' had enunciated a test
which was given an increasingly more liberal interpretation in sub-
sequent decisions. Ginzburg et. al. constitutes a dangerously regres-
sive step.
This Note will analyze the three new decisions and attempt to
determine their significance. First, it will be necessary to review
briefly the history of the Court's behavior in the area of obscenity.
Second, a detailed commentary on the views of the different Justices
in Ginzburg et. al. will be attempted. Finally, an attempt will be
made to isolate and analyze the factors combining to attain such a
result - a result which is a serious step backward in the evolution
of freedom of expression.
1383 U.S. 463 (1966)
2383 U.S. 502 (1966)
3 This element is first mentioned in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a
Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Farny
HiQl] and emphasized in Mishkw and Ginzburg.
4383 U.S. 413 (1966).
5378 U.S. 184 (1964)
6354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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I. A BIEF REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF OBSCENITY
In Regina v Hicklin,7 Chief Justice Cockburn stated: "I think
the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose mids
are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publi-
cation of this sort may fall."' Thus, according to this early English
view - probably the first obscenity standard enunciated - a work
would be obscene if any part of it so appeared in the opinion of the
least sophisticated members of a community.
After extensive use in most American jurisdictions, this severe
standard was challenged by Judge Learned Hand in United States v.
Kennerly9 in 1913. Judge Hand portended the "contemporary com-
munity standards" element of the current obscenity test, emphasiz-
ing the lack of reason in forcing society to accept as its own the
limitations of its weakest members."
If there be no abstract definition [of obscenity] should not
the word "obscene" be allowed to indicate the present critical
point in the compromise between candor and shame at which the
commaunty may have arrzved here and now? To put thought
in leash to the average consczence of the ttme is perhaps tolerable
but to fetter it by the necessities of the lowest and least capable
seems a fatal policy.1
The Hicklin test was finally rejected in Unted States v. One
Book Enttled Ulysses,'" when the Second Circuit recognized the
necessity of examining a work in its entirety before reaching a deter-
mination of whether it is "obscene."
The Supreme Court was first directly confronted with the issue
of obscenity in the 1957 case of Butler v. Michtgan.8 In that deci-
sion, the Court made clear that adults could not be denied access to
material merely because it might tend to corrupt minors. That same
term, the Court handed down the key decision of Roth v. Unted
States.'4 There it held that obscenity is not protected by the first
amendment, as obscene matter is utterly without redeeming social
7 L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868)
8Id. at 371. (Emphasis added.)
9 209 Fed. 119, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
1 United States v. Kennerly, 209 Fed. 119, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
"1 Id. at 121.
12 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934)
13 352 U.S. 380 (1957) See 16 W Pits. L. Rav. 780 (1965); Lockhart & Mc-
Clure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standard, 45 MINN.
L. REV. 5 (1960)
14 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
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importance. 5 Obscenity was defined as material dealing with sex
in a manner which appeals to the prurient interest, that is, material
which tends to excite lustful thoughts. 6 Any idea with "even the
slightest redeeming social importance" is fully protected by the Con-
stitution unless it infringes on a more important interest. Next, the
Court enunciated a standard by which obscenity must be judged:
"Whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole ap-
peals to prurient interest.""
In its next serious consideration of the obscenity issue, Jacobellis
v. Ohio, 8 the Court clarified one element of the Roth decision. The
"contemporary community standards" referred to in Roth relate to a
national, not a local concept; the standards are determined by so-
ciety as a whole, not by the local community.'" The wisdom and
the practicability of such a standard will not be discussed here."0
Concerning the definition of obscenity, Jacobellis clarifies an-
other element left uncertain in Roth. Roth adopted the Model
Penal Code test of appeal to prurient interest,' but defined obscene
material as that "having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts,"2
the latter having been rejected by the Model Penal Code. Thus, the
true meaning of the Model Penal Code test was rejected in Roth.
In Jacobellis, however, the Court emphasized that in order to be ob-
scene, material must not only appeal predominantly to prurient in-
terest, but must in addition go "substantially beyond customary
15 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
S6 Id. at 487 n.20. See 16 W RES. L. REv. 780, 781 (1965).
17 354 U.S. at 489. This standard had already been utilized by some American
jurisdictions in lieu of that of Hicklin. In affirming Roth, the Court noted that its
standard had been correctly applied in the lower courts.
In four later per curiam decisions, the Court reversed decisions of courts of appeals
supporting censorship. Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958)"
One Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958); Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180
(1957); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957). These cases
are discussed in Lockhart & McClure, supra note 13, at 5, 32-33 nn. 163-66.
In Kingsley Intl Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Umv. of N. Y., 360 U.S. 684
(1959), the Court forbade ideological censorship. In that same year, the Court had
opportunity to indicate the necessity of scienter as an element of the crime, Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
18378 U.S. 184 (1964).
9jJacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964); 16 W lis. L REV. 780, 782
(1965).
20 See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 13; 16 W REs. L REV. 780, 782-84
(1965).2 1Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957).
22 1lhd. Model Penal Code § 207, 10(2), comment 2(a) (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1957).
23 Model Penal Code § 251.4(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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limits of candor in describing or representing such matters."23 This
is stressed as a separate and distinct element of obscenity by the
Model Penal Code.
Thus, after the Jacobellis decision, it appeared that obscenity
required proof of three distinct elements: (1) that the material as a
whole appeal to prurient interest; (2) that this aspect of appeal
dominate other appeal or value of the material; and (3) that the
material be "patently offensive."24  This latter element had been
grafted onto the Roth test by Manuel Enterprises, Inc. v. Day.25
Since the Jacobellis Court referred to socoety's standards of decency
in evaluating the character of a work, apparently a national standard
was to be applied here too.2"
In the Jacobellis case, six different opinions were written, re-
flecting the confusion and lack of agreement among the members of
the Court. Nevertheless, in 1964, it appeared that certain criteria
had been established in the Court's position on obscenity: (1) The
Court will give de novo review to questions of constitutional fact;
(2) No material may be examined in isolated parts; (3) A national
standard is to be applied in evaluating "obscenity", (4) Material
with any amount of social value must be protected under the first
and fourteenth amendments; and (5) Obscenity is a variable con-
cept, allowing protection of minors from access to material which
may be proper for adults.2"
II. GINZBURG ET. AL.
A. The Cases
From all fourteen opinions written in the Ginzburg group of
cases, one element becomes clear: intrinsically non-obscene material
may become suppressible material according to the method used in
advertising it, even though the material could not itself satisfy the
tests of the Roth and later cases. Thus, it is now apparently quite
possible to determine that a work has "redeeming social value," and
yet suppress it depending on the manner utilized in its dissemination.
In Roth, as in all subsequent cases, the determination of obscen-
ity or non-obscenity was based solely on an examination of the ma-
terial itself. Now, under Ginzburg et. al., extrinsic matters - the
24 16 W REs. L. REV. 780, 785 (1966)
25 370 U.S. 478, 482-88 (1962), in which Justice Harlan referred to the quality
of "patent offensiveness" or "indecency" as a distinct element of obscenity.
26 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1964) (Emphasis added.)
27 16 W REs. L. REV. 780, 787 (1965) See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 13.
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nature and quality of advertising - may also be considered. The
only prior indication of the interjection of this new element can be
found in Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion in Roth:
[T]he conduct of the defendant is the central issue, not the ob-
scenity of a book or picture. The nature of the material is, of
course, relevant as an attribute of the defendanes conduct, but the
materials are thus placed in context from which they draw color
and character. A wholly different result mght be reached in a
different setting.
The personal element in these cases is seen most strongly in
the requirement of scieiter. The defendants in both these
cases were engaged in the business of purveying textual or graphic
matter openly advertised to appeal to the erotic interest of their
customers. They were plainly engaged in the commercial exploita-
tion of the morbid and shameful craving for materials with pruri-
ent effect. I believe that the State and Federal Governments can
constitutionally punish such conduct.28
In Ginzburg, petitioners were charged with violations of the
federal obscenity statute." The only issue to be decided involved
whether the Roth standards had been correctly applied to the case
in the lower courts. Justice Brennan, delivering the opinion of
the Court, pointed out that prior to this case, only the materials at
issue were considered in the determination of obscenity. Here, how-
ever, the prosecution charged the offense "in the context of the cir-
cumstances of production, sale, and attendant publicity"' and ad-
mitted that, considered on their merits alone, the publications them-
selves might not be obscene.
Looking at the three publications involved here - Eros, Liason,
and The Housewife's Handbook on Selectwe Promtscuity - Justice
Brennan stated that consideration of the "setting' in which the pub-
lications were presented was permissible in determining the question
of obscenity - that the publications were being viewed against "a
background of commercial exploitation of erotica solely for the sake
28 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495-96 (concurring opinion) (Emphasis
added).
29 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964). The statute provides in part:
Every obscene, lewd matter, thing and . every written or
printed card, letter book advertisement, or notice of any kind giving
information, directly or indirectly, where, or how, or from whom, or by what
means any of such mentioned matters may be obtained is declared to
be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered
from any post office or by any letter carrier. Whoever knowingly uses the
mails for the mailing, carriage in the mails, or delivery of anything declared
by this section to be nonmailable shall be fined not more than $5000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both, for the first such offense
30 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966)
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of their prurient appeal. '81 In fact, the Court "assumed without de-
cding' that the prosecution could not have succeeded otherwise.
Examining the context in which all three publications were
sold, the Court concluded that the "leer of the sensualist" permeated
their advertising.8" Thus, the publicity stressed the sexual candor of
the publication. There was definite emphasis and even boasting that
the publishers were taking full advantage of the license allowed un-
der the liberal Supreme Court decisions in the obscenity area. Con-
cerning the Handbook specifically, the Court was disturbed by the fact
that the solicitation was "indiscriminate" and not limited to those
who might be able to identify the book's "therapeutic worth," such
as physicians or psychiatrists.8 In a controlled environment, the
book could have value, namely, if directed to a limted audience.
But here, according to the Court, the petitioners emphasized the
"sexually provocative aspects of the work, in order to catch the
salaciously disposed," 4 proclaiming its obscenity rather than any
value it might have. Thus, it was only reasonable for the lower
court to adopt the publisher's own evaluation of the work, despite
other evidence. The Court summarized its feelings here in stating:
Where the purveyor's sole emphasis is on the sexually provocative
aspects of his publications, that fact may be decisive in the deter-
mmaton of obscenity.. . [T]he fact that [the materials in-
volved] originate or are used as a subject of pandering is relevant
to the application of the Roth test.
We perceive no threat to First Amendment guarantees in thus
holding that = close cases evidence of pandering may be probative
with respect to the nature of the material in question and thus
satisfy the Roth test.38
Further, "questionable" publications become obscene in a context
which renders them obscene according to Roth standards. " The
exploitation of the publications involved here on the basis of their
appeal to prurient interests lends itself to the conclusion that no
sales of constitutionally protected matter were involved here, but
rather only sales of "illicit merchandise," with no claim to first
amendment protection.8
The Court concluded its opinion by impliedly emphasizing the
31 Id. at 466.
-321d. at 468.
83 Id. at 469-70.
34 Id. at 472.
35Id. at 470-71, 474. (Emphasis added.)
361d. at 475.
87 Ibid.
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varutble nature of its concept of obscenity- while material in certain
contexts might not be obscene, an "exploitation of interests in titil-
lation" by extensive emphasis on the sexual aspects of the same ma-
terial may render it such."i Before analyzing the import of the
Ginzburg decision and its dissenting opinions, it is essential to exam-
me briefly its two companion cases, Mishkm v. New York"9 and A
Book Named "John Cleland's Memows of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Massachusetts.
4 0
In Mishkzn, the Court again upheld convictions under a crum-
nal obscenity statute.41 Fifty books were involved in this case, por-
traying both normal and abnormal sexual relations and activities,
including homosexuality and sado-masochistic acts. The Court first
rejected appellants' contention that the New York law was invalid
on its face as exceeding first amendment limitations and that it was
impermissibly vague, on the ground that the New York definition
of "obscenity" was even more narrowly defined than that of Roth.
Next, the Court examined the nature of the material being sold by
appellant. Appellant urged that since the materials involved por-
trayed certain abnormal sexual practices, for example, flagellation
and lesbianism, they could not satisfy the Roth criterion of appealing
to the prurient interest of the "average person," and that on the
contrary they would "disgust and sicken." 3 The Court rejected this
reasoning as an incorrect interpretation of the prurient appeal cri-
terion:
Where the material is designed for and primarily disseminated to a
clearly defined deviant sexual group, rather than the public at
large, the prurient-appeal requirement of the Roth test is satisfied
if the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
the prurient interest in sex of the -members of that group.4" ,
Justice Brennan went on to explain that the "average" or "normal"
person concept was utilized in Roth in order to express rejection of
the Hicklin "most susceptible person" standard. Since this material
would appeal only to the sexually immature, the prurient-appeal re-
38 Ibu.
39383 U.S. 502 (1966).
40 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
41 N. Y. Penal Code § 1141 was involved here. Appellant was convicted of vio-
lating this law by hiring others to prepare obscene books, publishing obscene books,
and possessing obscene books with intent to sell them.
42 Mishkm v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 506 (1966). See People v. Richmond
County News, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 578, 586-87, 175 N.E.2d 681, 685-86 (1961).
43 Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508 (1966)
44 bTd.
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quirement must be adjusted to "social realities," namely, by assessing
its appeal to its ntended audience, although not to the most suscep-
tible members of the community.45 In Mishkzn, the books were
"conceived and marketed" for sexually deviant groups and the Court
found that they appealed to the prurient interest of these groups.46
In Fanny Hill, the Supreme Court reversed the Massachusetts'
court's finding of obscenity A civil equity suit was involved in this
case, rather than a criminal prosecution, and in effect the book itself
was placed on trial rather than the publisher. As indicated previ-
ously, this decision is no victory for the proponents of free expres-
sion. For in this case, the Court merely determined that one of the
three elements of the Roth obscenity test had been incorrectly applied
by the lower courts.
The three requisite elements of obscenity, as defined in Roth,
elaborated in subsequent cases, and reiterated here, are: (1) that the
dominant theme of material taken as a whole appeals to the
prurient interest; (2) that the material be patently offensive be-
cause it affronts contemporary community standards in the repre-
sentation of sex; and (3) that the material be utterly without
redeeming social unportance.47 The lower court in Fanny Hill
held that although the book might have minimal literary value,
nevertheless it may not be of any social importance and that, at
any rate, it need not be unqualifiedly worthless before it can be con-
sidered obscene if it satisfies the first two criteria of obscenity The
Supreme Court emphasized that each criterion is a federal constitu-
tional standard which must be applied independently." A book
cannot be proscribed unless it is utterly without redeeming social
importance. Thus, no balancing of the criteria, one against the
other, is permissible; each is absolute.
These statements by the Court, and its holding in Fanny Hill,
are of little significance. Since only the book itself was being
"judged" and no criminal conviction was involved, a reiteration of
the Roth standards - in a manner consistent with cases subsequent
to Roth - was only to be expected. Furthermore, apparently to
make certain of no misunderstanding, the Court continued its opin-
ion by eliminating all doubt of "victory" for those opposing censor-
ship:
45 Id. at 508-09.
46Id. at 509.
4 7 Fanny Hill, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966)
4 8 Id. at 419.
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It does not necessarily follow from this reversal that a deter-
mination that Memotrs is obscene in the constitutional sense would
be improper under all circumstances. On the premise that
Memotrs has the requisite prurient appeal and is patently offen-
sive but has only a minimum of social value the circumstances of
production, sale, and publicity are relevant in determining whether
or not the publication and distribution of the book is constitution-
ally protected.4 9
The Court alleged that this did not involve a relaxation of the
"utterly without redeeming social importance" concept, but rather
involved only the acceptance of the publisher's own evaluation of
his publications. Thus, if his entire emphasis is on the "sexually
provocative" aspects of his publications, this will be accepted. 0
Again, the Court emphasized that this particular proceeding was de-
void of any specific facts concerning circumstances of production,
sale, and publicity. Had the situation been otherwise, the result
might well have been different.
No attempt will be made here to discuss every concurring and
dissenting opinion in all three cases. Only the most interesting
ones will be mentioned.
It suffices to clarify the position of each of the Justices. Justice
Brennan delivered the opinions of the Court in all three cases;
Black, Stewart, Douglas, and Harlan dissented in Ginzburg, as did
the three former in Mishkin; Douglas concurred in Fanny Hill, in
which Clark and Harlan dissented.
The most interesting arguments are brought forth in the Ginz-
burg dissents. A major point emphasized by several of the dissent-
ing Justices involved the violation of due process inherent in Ginz-
burg's conviction. Justice Black pointed out that the majority of
the Court had essentially rewritten the federal obscenity statute,
imposing certain standards and criteria which, if intended by Con-
gress, were never enacted. Ginzburg was not charged with violation
of this "amended" statute in the lower courts, but was nevertheless
being convicted of violating it in the highest Court - dearly a vio-
lation of due process.51 Similarly, Justice Stewart, in a brilliant
dissent, emphasized that Ginzburg was found guilty by the Court of
"commercial exploitation," "pandering," and "titillation" 
- acts
for which he was never charged, which are not made criminal by
any statute, and which no statute could make criminal without being
49 Id. at 420. (Emphasis added.)
5 b id.
51 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476-78 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
1966] 1333
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unconstitutionally vague and therefore void.52 Justice Harlan as-
serted the same point. According to him, the Court here was writing
a new statute, taking the objective test of Roth and supplementing
it by another test concerning whether the mailer's goal is to "pander
to" or to "titillate" those to whom he mails questionable matter."
Harlan points out that prior to Ginzburg, evidence of a defendant's
conduct was only admissible to show "relevant intent." Now,
evidence as to "attitude" and "motive," as well as conduct, is allowed
on the basic question of obscenity- "I have difficulty seeing how
these inquiries are logically related to the question whether a par-
ticular work is obscene. Such a test for obscenity is impermissibly
vague and unwarranted. "5
Justice Douglas emphasized another point: a book should be
judged on its intrinsic merits, not on the reasons for which it was
written or the advertising or "wiles" used in selling it.55 To him,
emphasis on certain parts of the Bible in its dissemination could
not render it outside the protection of the first amendment. The
"test" being used by the majority, he asserted, is characterized pri-
marily by "uncertainty," which is necessarily detrimental to free ex-
pression.56 Black asserted a similar proposition in stressing that
judges and jurors cannot apply any of the elements composing ob-
scenity with any uniformity or certainty. In each case, only a com-
pletely subjective determination could be made by these individuals,
which would actually depend on their own personal habits and
proclivities and which would vary from community to community
as well. After the Ginzburg majority opinion, Black is convinced
that no one can know what is obscene and what is not. So obnox-
ious is this condition that - although in his view the first amend-
ment forbids all censorship of views as distinguished from con-
duct57 - censorship in advance of publication could be preferable
to this "unpredictable book-by-book censorship into which we have
now drifted."5"
B. An Evaluation
With Roth v. United States, in 1957, it appeared that the test
established by the Supreme Court was intended to accomplish two
52 Id. at 497, 500 (dissenting opinion)
53 Id. at 493, 494 (dissenting opinion)
54 Id. at 497
55 Id. at 482.
56 Id. at 483.
57 Id. at 481. Justices Black and Douglas of course adhere to this proposition.
58 Ibfd.
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goals. First, an attempt was made to set forth an objective standard
which trial courts would be able to apply and which would obviate
constant appeals to and review by the United States Supreme Court.
Second, although obscenity was excluded from the purview of first
amendment protection, there was a great interest in protecting free-
dom of expression by guarding anything not obscene from over-
zealous censors. These two goals appeared to remain present in
the Court's attitude toward obscenity in all decisions subsequent
to Roth and prior to Ginzburg. It now seems entirely reasonable
to assert that each of these goals has been seriously subverted by
the Ginzburg group of cases.
With Ginzburg et. al., a highly subjective element has been
engrafted onto the Roth test and standards for judging obscenity.
This added element will further confuse trial courts - already
embroiled in an area which defies any real delineation - and add
to the Supreme Court's flood of censorship cases. And, as previ-
ously indicated, it will seriously deter freedom of expression and
expose this area to the self-appointed "watch-guards" of the moral
fiber of our society.
While Fanny Hill reaffirmed the three requisite elements of the
test in Roth and subsequent cases, it held that all three elements
must coalesce and must be independently satisfied before a deter-
mination of obscenity may be reached. But the Ginzburg decision
added the new element: when objective examination of the three
criteria is not conclusive, the courts may examine the publisher's
intent and motives as established by his marketing and advertising
practices. If he attempted to pander to or to titillate the public's
sexual interest, stressing this aspect of the material he is selling,
then his own evaluation of the material may be taken "at its face
value" and a finding of obscenity established. The Mishkm decision
redefined the element of prurient appeal by asserting that it is really
not the "average person" whose prurient interest must be aroused
in order for a work to be obscene; a work may be obscene if it is de-
signed for deviant sexual groups and appeals to the prurient interest
of the "average member" of these groups.
In evaluating these three decisions, a preliminary question might
well c6ncern the source and reason for the engrafting of the new
"pandering" element. It is submitted here that just as the Supreme
Court has relied extensively on Lockhart and McClure, the two lead-
ing experts in the constitutional area of obscenity, in all prior ob-
scenity decisions, it again relied on them in the Ginzburg group of
1966] 1335
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cases."9 Although the Court had avoided adoption of this facet of
their ideas until this year, much of Roth and Jacobellis, for example,
stemmed directly from their writings. In Jacobellis, the opinion of
the Court did indicate a varzable concept of obscenity, for the Court
stated that had the film involved been directed toward minors, the
standard employed and result attained might well have been differ-
ent.6" But a concept of obscenity which is variable only on the
basis of a distinction between adults and minors is far different from
the one now adopted by the Court. For the concept now adopted
by the Court is a totally variable one. In judging obscenity, the in-
trinsic nature of the material will depend on the audience to which
it is directed via marketing and advertising. This is basically the
position advanced by Lockhart and McClure:"' censorship should be
limited to material "°treated?' as hard-core pornography, because it is
the "manner in which it is marketed and the primary audience to
which it is sold" which should be determinative of obscenity, not
the intrinsic value of the material alone.62 It is by this means alone,
they claim, that hard-core pornography may occasionally be dis-
tributed legitimately for scientific purposes, "while at the same time
censorship of material that is not intrinsically hard-core pornography
can be permitted when the manner of marketing and the primary
audience to which it is marketed indicate that it is being treated as
hard-core pornography - that its function in that setting is to
nourish erotic fantasies of the sexually immature."'6  It is submitted
here that there are some basic problems inherent in a concept of
obscenity this variable. Primarily, while the first goal of allowing
occasional dissemination of even hard-core pornography may be
achieved under this concept, there is every reason to believe that
many "average" adults will effectively be prevented from all expo-
sure to material which has intrinsic social value in order to "protect"
the "sexually immature." The Lockhart and McClure theory as-
sumes that it is necessary to protect the sexually immature in our
society and that it is possible to determine who these people are.
It is urged here, first, that no reason has been shown for such
protection of society The only justification for censorship would
59 See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 13.
60 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964)
61 See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 13; Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity Cen-
sorship: The Core Constituttomna Issue - What zs Obscene? 7 UTAH L. REv. 289, 298
(1961)
62 Lockhart & McClure, supra note 61, at 298.
63 Ibtd.
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arise from reasonably conclusive evidence of a correlation between
obscene materials and anti-social behavior, for example, sex crimes.
No such correlation has been proven and authoritative studies appear
to negate the correlation, and occasionally even to support the value
of obscenity. 4 It is urged that until this correlation is shown, only
censorship of hard-core pornography directed at mnors alone is
justifiable. There is no other certain or objective way of discrimi-
nating among "types of audiences." Further, as pointed out else-
where"5 and by Justice Stewart in his Ginzburg dissent, censorship
inherently reflects a lack of self-confidence of a society in its people,
a feeling that moral tutelage is necessary and that pluralistic
standards of private conduct are impermissible. The more primitive
or the more totalitarian a society, the more extensive its censorship.
Let society expend its efforts in enforcing prohibitions on sales of
certain materials to minors, rather than in limiting the individual's
essential need for freedom of expression by proscribing materials for
all. If no harm to others results from exposure to obscenity, let
each individual guard his own "moral fiber." Government has no
place here.
The addition of the "pandering" element to the obscenity test
has even more serious faults. Despite pronouncements of the ma-
jority opinions in Ginzburg et. al. to the contrary, this element
in practical effect negates the meaning of the Roth decision. For in
"close cases" - which must mean in almost every case - there
will inevitably be some doubt or question as to satisfaction of the
three objective criteria set forth in and developed from Roth. And
once this doubt or question appears, the courts may examine the
advertising involved. If it is not clear whether a work appeals to
the prurient interest, sexually stimulating advertising will be held
to determine the point. And if the advertising dwells on the sexual
aspects of a work, this will be considered to support its "patent
offensiveness." Finally, it is submitted that the third Roth cri-
terion - "redeeming social value" - is now totally nullified. A
work is no longer examined for its intrinsic value alone. Thus, a de-
termination that a work had some value, that it was not "utterly with-
out redeeming social importance," may apparently be off-set by the
circumstances of the marketing of the work. Publications with
64 See studies by Margaret Mead and other leading sociologists and anthropologists,
li Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutonal
Standard, 45 MiNN. L. REV. 5 (1960). See Murphy, The Value of Pornography, 10
WAYNE L. REV. (1964).
65 16 W R.-S. L. REV. 780, 786 (1965).
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admitted social value may be suppressed, even though the adver-
using employed is not by itself obscene and even though the ma-
terial by itself and by definition is not obscene. In 1966, this is a
tragic defeat for those believing in the sanctity of freedom of ex-
pression. As Justice Stewart said:
Long ago those who wrote our First Amendment charted a
different course. They believed a society can be truly strong only
when it is truly free. In the realm of expression they put their
faith, for better or for worse, in the enlightened choice of the
people, free from the interference of a policeman's intrusive thumb
or a judge's heavy hand. So it is that the Constitution protects
coarse expression as well as refined, and vulgarity no less than ele-
gance. A book worthless to me may convey something of value to
my neighbor. In the free society to which our Constitution has
committed us, it is for each to choose for himself.
In upholding and enforcing the Bill of Rights, this Court has
no power to pick or to choose. When we lose sight of that fixed
star of constitutional adjudication, we lose our way. For then we
foresake a government of law and are left with government by Big
Brother. 6
One further aspect of the Ginzburg group of cases should be
examined. This is the "redefinition" of the "average person" con-
cept enunciated in Roth as related to the prurient appeal aspect of
that test. In Mishkin v. New York,6" as previously discussed, ma-
terial concerned with deviant sexual practices which allegedly ap-
pealed to the prurient interests of those groups - and those
groups alone - was held to be obscene. The Court claimed that
the terms "average" or "normal" person utilized in Roth were only
intended to reject the "most susceptible person" standard enshrined
by the Hicklin case. " Prurient appeal must now be assessed in
terms of "the sexual interests of its intended and probable recipient
group";6 9 and since this group must be defined more specifically
than merely as "sexually immature," the Court clarms that it avoids
the inadequacies of the Hicklin test."°
It should first be admitted that the Court's view is entirely logical
in its development. That is, the nature of the appeal to pruriency
is no different under Roth than under Mishkin; it is the nature of
the group that is different in its particular demands, tastes, and in-
clinations. In Mishkin, as previously in Roth, the Court did indeed
66 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 497, 498-501 (1966). (dissenting opimon)
67383 U.S. 502 (1966)
68 1d. at 509.
69 Ibid.
70 lbtd.
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reject the Hicklin standard. According to Hicklin, in order for
material to be obscene, it would have to "deprave and corrupt" the
susceptible;"' according to Roth, it would have to stimulate the sex-
ual interest of the average or normal person, not "deprave and cor-
rupt;" and according to Mishkin, it could not deprave or corrupt,
because the particular group established as the criterion would al-
ready be "depraved and corrupt." Under Hicklin, there could be no
finding of obscenity given the Mishkzn situation, because the ma-
terials could not deprave or corrupt a group which is already both.
Under Roth, read literally and logically, there could be no finding
of obscenity given the Mishkm situation because the materials deal-
ing with aberrant sexual practices could not (within the realms of
knowledge in this area) appeal to the average or normal person -
they could only disgust. The result is different under Mishkzn,
because the nature of the group examined is different and the result-
ing definition of "average" is changed accordingly.
Is the Supreme Court's logic adequate? Is it based on a consid-
eration of the whole meaning and import of the Roth test? The
Roth test goes beyond pruriency to the question of redeeming social
value. On this basis, although the Mishkzn test appears logical as
far as it goes, it is so narrowly focused as to ignore the concept of
the total role of literature in society. This, it is submitted, is the
real reason for the strong dissents and the general dissatisfaction
with the decision. The real element of inadequacy in the Mishkzn
decision, as in Ginzburg, is that it results in the exclusion of certain
groups, ipso facto, from the whole realm of social value. What is
of value to these groups, namely, to homosexuals, sadists, and maso-
chists, is declared to be of no value by the Court Thus, the Court
is making a sociological, rather than a legal, determination as to
what has social value versus what does not - and a sociological de-
termination which has no sufficient basis and which cannot be sup-
ported. It is condemning entire groups of people by not allowing
them free expression, essentially saying that they are "obscene," since
anything which appeals to them becomes automatically obscene.
The repugnant nature of such a test is probably best expressed by
Justice Douglas in his combined Mishkrn-Ginzburg dissent.7" There
he raises certain fundamental questions about the majority's outlook
and analysis of this facet of the obscenity standards. Why is it un-
lawful to cater to the needs of deviant sexual groups? Even if their
71 Regina v. Hiddin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 371 (1868)
72 Ginzbujrg v. Umted States, 383 U.S. 463, 482 (1966).
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ideas are nonconforming or unappealing, should such groups be pre-
vented from being able to communicate with each other "by the
'written word" '?
When the Court today speaks of "social value" does it mean a
"value" to the majority? Why is not a minority "value" cogniza-
ble? If we were wise enough we might know that communi-
cation may have greater therapeutical value than any sermon that
those of the "normal" community can ever offer. But if commum-
cation is of value to the masochistic community or to others of the
deviant community, how can it be said to be "utterly without any
redeeming social Importance"? "Redeeming" to whom? "Impor-
tance" to whom?74
Implicit in Douglas' words is another consideration: certainly
members of these deviant groups can communicate with each other
in all respects (for example, verbally and sexually) except by the
written word. Why should they be deprived of this medium of com-
munication? Is it for the Court to decide that nothing they could
communicate in writing could be beautiful, meaningful, or have
value to them? This communication might actually serve positive
goals by encouraging expression, rather than repression, of inner de-
sires and perhaps even by helping to prevent anu-social behavior.
Certainly it is not for the Court to decide what should be orthodox
in literature. "An omniscience would be required which few in our
whole society possess."75
Il1. CONCLUSION
If the first amendment has any meaning, it is that ideas which
are not utterly worthless or which do not incite to action must be
allowed free expression - whether they are "good," "bad," appeal-
ing, or non-appealing. The tragic aspect of the Ginzburg group of
cases is that this basic protection of expression in our society has
suffered a serious set-back.
It is not enough, however, merely to criticize the decisions; a
substitute should be suggested. It is submitted here that obscenity
should be considered within the ambit of the first amendment. If
this were the case, the dear and present danger test could then be
applied, so that any materials which might incite to "action"' could be
73 Id. at 489.
741d. at 489-90. Earlier, in One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958), the Court
reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit which had forbidden the dissemination of
a homosexual magazine. There can be little doubt that this result would now have to
be reversed.
75 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 491 (1966)
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proscribed. All other material would be allowed free reign so that
all members and groups in our society - representing majority or
minority views, normal or abnormal ideas - could express them-
selves without fear of legal repercussions. Surely, our society is
mature enough to tolerate in writing that same pluralism of private
moral standards which obtains in fact in the realm of conduct.
Why should a free society fear to write and read about the "darker"
or deviant aspects of human emotions and conduct? Surely, the
danger of such writings to our society is less than that of a capricious
censorship which, with no sound basis in sociology, psychology, or
law, would stifle the freedom of expression we consider to be our
right. The day will come when Ginzburg will be considered a
victim, not a criminal.
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